Sybil Resistance
Sybil attacks involve a single entity creating multiple false identities to disproportionately influence the network. To counter this, the Arcium Network leverages Proof of Stake consensus, requiring each node to stake a minimum amount to operate.
In the Arcium Network, Sybil resistance is crucial for maintaining the integrity and security of the system. To address potential Sybil attacks, Arcium implements strategies on two levels:
Intra-Cluster Sybil Resistance: Preventing collusion among nodes within the same cluster. By requiring the inclusion of at least one randomly selected node in all non-permissioned clusters, the network ensures that even if some nodes attempt to collude, the presence of an independent node acts as a counterbalance, significantly reducing the risk of intra-cluster Sybil attacks.
Network-Wide Sybil Resistance: To protect the entire network from Sybil attacks, Arcium increases cluster node-set sizes and includes a random node in each non-permissioned cluster. Additionally, the network participants employ node operator reputation systems, encouraging community engagement to monitor and report suspicious activities; furthermore, the network also imposes heavier slashing punishments for concurrent node downtimes.
1. Intra-Cluster Sybil Resistance
Intra-cluster Sybil resistance mitigates the risk of collusion among nodes within the same cluster, which could compromise the confidentiality of shared secrets. Even with a diverse node set across the broader network, smaller, centralized node sets within individual public clusters may still be vulnerable.
To address this, the Arcium Network ensures the inclusion of at least one randomly selected node in all non-permissioned clusters. This node, chosen from the broader network, serves as an independent counterbalance, reducing the likelihood of intra-cluster Sybil attacks. As long as at least one honest node exists in a cluster, the integrity of the cluster remains intact. These measures collectively preserve the security and confidentiality of cluster operations.
2. Network-Wide Sybil Resistance
Network-wide Sybil attacks aim to compromise protocol-wide consensus mechanisms, such as Base Price Voting and the Non-Participation Detection system. To safeguard against such attacks, the Arcium Network employs several layered strategies:
Random Node Inclusion: As mentioned above, non-permissioned clusters include at least one randomly selected node to ensure diversity and impartiality.
Cluster Node-Set Scaling: Increasing the size and diversity of cluster node sets enhances overall network security.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs): Nodes within clusters may optionally offer TEEs to further strengthen confidentiality and trustworthiness.
Node Operator Reputation Systems: Off-chain reputation systems allow node operators to build trust based on past performance, community engagement, and prior experience with network validation services (from other chains and protocols).
Community Monitoring: Active community involvement provides a social defense layer, encouraging participants to monitor and report suspicious activities.
Strategic Penalties: Heavier slashing penalties are imposed for concurrent node downtimes. This discourages the setup of multiple nodes with similar configurations or in close geographic proximity, incentivizing diversification across jurisdictions, data centers, operating systems, and security practices.
These measures collectively enhance the Arcium Network's resilience, ensuring its ability to withstand and recover from coordinated Sybil attack attempts while maintaining robust security and operational reliability.
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